Classroom Barricade Device Myths and Facts

Classroom barricade devices are secondary locking devices designed to be installed in addition to existing classroom door hardware. These devices have emerged in the last few years in response to fears that inadequate security may leave classrooms vulnerable during an active shooter incident. Many anxious parents and lawmakers across the country believe barricade devices will address the immediate need for security, but fire marshals and other code officials point to the safety concerns associated with this practice. As the debate rages across the country, several myths surrounding the use of barricade devices have sprung up, and it’s important to understand the facts. 

The following myths and facts about classroom barricade devices were presented on behalf of the Door Security and Safety Foundation, at the annual conference of the National Association of State Fire Marshals (NASFM).  NASFM members approved a resolution at the 2015 conference, supporting NASFM’s Classroom Door Security Checklist which was released earlier in the year and includes recommendations for code-compliant classroom security. Note:  The NASFM Classroom Door Security Checklist and much more information about school security can be accessed by visiting iDigHardware.com/schools.

Myth #1: Securing a classroom door during a lockdown should take priority over allowing safe evacuation.

One of the most common arguments in support of classroom barricade devices is that because they are only intended for use during an active shooter incident, preventing the shooter from gaining access is more important than ensuring the classroom occupants can exit.  However, there is no guarantee that the device will only be utilized under these limited circumstances, and its misuse would prevent authorized access by staff and emergency responders, as well as delaying or preventing egress.

Myth #2: If the product is not permanently attached to the door, it is not under the jurisdiction of the code official and is not subject to the same requirements that conventional locks and security hardware must meet.

Following this premise, panic hardware secured with padlocks and chains or fire doors blocked open with wood wedges would not be under the code officials’ jurisdiction either. In reality, code officials address these unsafe temporary conditions frequently, as most codes do not differentiate between a device used temporarily and one that is permanently installed.

Myth #3: Using barricade devices is no different than using furniture as a barricade, which is recommended by many organizations, including the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and many others.

Barricading a location with furniture and other environmental items is a secondary response for incidents of an active shooter or terrorism and is recommended if evacuation as a primary response is not possible. This form of barricading uses gross motor skills, is applicable in any location, and does not require a special door locking device.

Myth #4: It is safe to relax the code requirements addressing fire protection because fatal school fires are no longer common.

The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) reports that between 2007 and 2011, U.S. fire departments responded to an estimated average of 5,690 structure fires in educational properties annually. Any one of these fires could have been tragic, as fatalities in school fires were not uncommon before the codes were put in place and enforced.  In addition, there are currently no widely-used standards for school security, and schools frequently call lockdowns for events that do not involve an active shooter.  Many situations could require an evacuation while a school is in lockdown, and doors must provide free egress to facilitate evacuation. The school shooting at Columbine High School reportedly involved a fire bomb to divert firefighters, propane tanks converted to bombs placed in the cafeteria, dozens of explosive devices, and bombs rigged in cars.

Myth #5: Conventional locksets will not effectively secure classrooms against active shooters.

Many locks provide the necessary level of security and meet the model code requirements for egress, fire protection, and accessibility.  These products are certified to meet recognized industry standards for security and durability, and are listed for use on a fire door assembly. There are also electrified locks available which can be locked using a fob, a code, or from a remote location.  All of these classroom locking products will allow free egress at any time.

Among the many findings reported by the Sandy Hook Advisory Commission, one of the most compelling was the revelation that, “The testimony and other evidence presented to the Commission reveals that there has never been an event in which an active shooter breached a locked classroom door.” It’s also important to note that a 2007 study called Barricaded Hostage and Crisis Situations in Schools: A Review of Recent Incidents, examined 19 such hostage situations that occurred between 1998 and 2007.  In 16 of the 19 cases, the perpetrator was a student at the school, meaning the threat was already in the room.

Myth #6: Lots of other states are allowing classroom barricade devices.

Although there are a few states where barricade devices have been allowed either by the state fire marshal or because of political intervention, many states have issued directives addressing their requirements for code-complaint hardware – for example, California, Florida, New York, and Minnesota.  The Minnesota rationale requiring code-compliant locks is very compelling given the fact that Minnesota is the location of the 2005 school shooting at Red Lake High School, where a 16-year-old killed seven people and wounded five others.  Although the classroom doors were locked, the shooter broke the glass and gained access to the classroom by turning the inside lever.  And yet, Minnesota has not responded to this incident by choosing inexpensive security over free egress, fire protection, and accessibility. Glazing products and films will delay access to the inside lever, and would be a much more logical solution than installing a barricade device.

Myth #7: Active shooter incidents are the biggest security threat to schools.

Nonfatal victimizations at school are thousands of times more likely to occur, and unauthorized lockdown of a classroom could help to create a haven for someone attempting to commit a crime. According to the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES):  “In 2012, students ages 12–18 were victims of about 1,364,900 nonfatal victimizations at school, including 615,600 thefts and 749,200 violent victimizations, 89,000 of which were serious violent victimizations.” These non-fatal victimizations, or student-on-student/student-on-teacher violence, are thousands of times more likely to occur in any given school than a school shooting, and schools could be held liable for failure to provide adequate security or for giving perpetrators the ability to easily barricade a door with no way for anyone to enter and assist.

Myth #8:  The benefits of barricade devices outweigh the risks.

The perceived benefit of barricade devices is the relatively low cost – most ranging from $50-$150, and the easy procurement and installation.  A locksmith could install a slide bolt or padlock and hasp and accomplish a similar level of security.  Historically, fire marshals have not allowed these security methods  because they do not comply with the national model codes.  Some jurisdictions are continuing to enforce current codes which do not allow these devices, and some are being pressured by school districts and politicians to put the codes aside in favor of security.  But the risks of restricting egress and delaying or preventing access for school staff and emergency responders could result in tragedy.

Society’s desire to react quickly and within budgetary restrictions sometimes leads to choices that may solve one problem but inadvertently create others.  We frequently see the unintended consequences of installing non-code-compliant products, like double-cylinder (key-operated) deadbolts - people have died because they were unable to escape through doors equipped with these locks.  We shouldn’t extend that risk to our classrooms. A holistic approach must be taken for classroom security including training, drills, key distribution, and impact-resistance of glazing adjacent to the hardware. There is no reason to sacrifice life safety in favor of security.

Lori Greene, AHC/CDC, FDAI, CCPR, CFPE, is Manager – Codes & Resources, Allegion. Visit her website, www.idighardware.com.